

Title: ***Stakeholder Analysis of Communication Policy Reform in Thailand*** \*

Author: Monwipa Wongrujira, Ph.D.  
School of Communication Arts, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University,  
Pakkred, Nontaburi Province 11120  
THAILAND  
Phone: +66 2 504 8384, Fax: +66 2 503 3580  
e-mail: [monwipa@gmail.com](mailto:monwipa@gmail.com)

Key words: broadcasting, media reform, stakeholder analysis, independent regulator, Thailand

---

### **Abstract**

This qualitative study aims to analyze the stakeholders involved in communication reform in Thailand. The study focuses on the establishment of the new broadcasting regulator (National Broadcasting Commission or NBC) during 2000-2007 because its establishment became a huge battleground, gaining broad attention from the Thai public.

The researcher utilized stakeholder analysis to examine stakeholders' power, interest, importance and influence, and designated four categories of stakeholders: *subjects*, *players*, *context setters* and *crowd*. The friction in the establishment of the Commission occurred between the *subjects* (civic sector, journalists, NGOs) and the *players* (bureaucrats, military, state broadcast operators, business concessionaires) who have high interests but different degrees of power and influence in policy reform. The *crowd* seemed to be a passive audience with both less interest and power. However, the most influential and powerful group was the *context setters*, especially the court, which eventually overturned the selection of the Commission because of conflict of interest and unaccountability in the process. To date, the reform is still stagnant. The longer it took to establish the Commission, the greater the damage to the broadcasting industry. Without a new independent regulator, no new broadcast licenses have been issued.

Policy development is usually seen as a bargain among the powerful elites. The analysis finds that Thai civil sector has increased its participation in the regulation process. The regulatory debate of Thai media reform, thus, is moving toward democratizing communication. The experience of establishing an independent regulator in Thailand could be a lesson for other developing countries where the process of communication reform is ongoing.

---

\* This paper was prepared to present in the CPR*South3*: Conference on "Transformation Strategies for Telecom Operators" at Beijing University, China, during December 5-7, 2008. The author would like to thank Professor Dr. Stephen McDowell for supervising the project during her doctoral study at Florida State University, USA.

## ***Stakeholder Analysis of Communication Policy Reform in Thailand***

### **I. Introduction**

Communication laws in Thailand were enforced for more than five decades (since the late 1950s) with minor amendments. They were obsolete, obstructed freedom of expression and sustained the state monopoly of the communication industry. The reform of communication regulation was initiated in the 1997 Constitution. The provision brought about other new communication laws intended to create new independent regulators—National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) and National Broadcasting Commission (NBC)—and facilitate the authority of these new regulators. This study focuses on the establishment of the new broadcasting regulator (NBC) during 2000-2007 because the selection of the Commissioners became a battleground, gaining attention from several relevant stakeholders.

The new structure of communication regulation would change the face of communication rules, system, and industry. The primary goal is to remove telecommunication and broadcasting ownership from state control. It is expected that the communication reform would enhance quality of service and content to better serve the public interest. This research studies the reform of Thai broadcasting policy and structure. The researcher used qualitative methodology by reviewing relevant documents (i.e. laws and official documents) and in-depth interviewing of key policy makers, state officials, scholars, broadcasters and media activists. The reviewed documents were collected from the primary and the secondary sources. The primary sources are official or state documents, including the laws and ministerial rules published in the state journal (*Royal Gazette*), meeting minutes of the parliament committee and the selection panels, petition letters from media professional associations, and ruling announcements of the courts. The secondary sources are the articles and newspaper reports of the reform issues during 2000-2007. These documents were retrieved from the newspaper archive databases (both in English and Thai language).

The researcher also conducted 27 face-to-face interviews with open-ended questions. These snow-ball samples consisted of the stakeholders relevant to the communication reform process, including 7 mass media and legal scholars, 5 journalism professionals, 4 senators, 3 media business entrepreneurs, 3 NGOs (focusing on media reform and democracy), 3 state officials, and 2 Army Generals. The researcher analyzes the stakeholders involving in the establishment of the new regulator (NBC) so as to understand their power, interests and influences during this stage of institutional restructuring. The analysis could help predict the changing direction of the country's broadcasting policy and regulation.

The paper begins with an overview of the structure of Thai communication regulation. It provides an overview of media ownership structure and a summary of regulation structure; then, initiation of media reform and the concept of Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA) are discussed. The next section focuses on the analysis of the stakeholders involved in the reform of broadcasting policy. Discussion of the stakeholders' contributions and suggestions for both policy making and future research are provided in the final section.

### **II. Structure of Thai Communication regulation**

Many communication laws in Thailand were enacted during the late 1950s when broadcasting media were first introduced to the Thai public. The laws mainly authorized the government, state agencies and the military to control both telecommunication and broadcasting. The main reasons were that the state should provide public utilities for public benefit and communication outlets should be used for the purposes of national unification and national security. Thus, most of the communication industry was facilitated and controlled by the state and its agencies.

## 1) Ownership Structure of Broadcasting Media

The ownership structure of both telecommunication and broadcasting system in Thailand was in state and military hands since the beginning. Broadcasting media were regarded as mechanisms for national unity and stability as well as government public relations tools. The Thai government assumed this public utility should be manipulated, operated and provided by the state, similar to other public utilities such as the water supply, electricity, transportation and telecommunication. While almost all print media were owned by the private sector, ownership of radio and television stations rests generally in the hands of the state, principally under the supervision of the Public Relation Department (PRD) (administered by Office of the Prime Minister) and the Ministry of Defense (see Table 1). There was also a state-owned enterprise, Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT), owned a number of radio stations and television channels. Although MCOT was privatized and became a public company in 2004, the main shareholder is the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, not only political actors but also business actors were key stakeholders in broadcasting media.

**Table 1:** Ownership structure of Thai broadcasting media

| <i>State Agencies</i>              | <i>Radio stations</i> | <i>TV network<sup>1</sup></i> |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Ministry of Defense                | 212                   | 2                             |
| Ministry of Transportation & Comm. | 19                    | -                             |
| Public Relations Department (PRD)  | 147                   | 2                             |
| Mass Comm. Org. (MCOT)             | 62                    | 2                             |
| National Police Bureau             | 41                    | -                             |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs        | 1                     | -                             |
| Ministry of Agriculture            | 5                     | -                             |
| Ministry of Education              | 15                    | -                             |
| Parliament                         | 16                    | -                             |
| Others                             | 17                    | -                             |
| Total                              | 535                   | 6                             |

**Source:** Office of National Broadcasting Administrative Commission, Public Relations Department, and Wangvivatana (2005).

Although most broadcasting media are in the hands of government and state-owned enterprises, some radio and television stations granted a concession to private companies as part of a patronage system. The companies developed strong relationships with the military or the government when the concessions were granted; as such, television concessions were prolonged for more than 50 years. Ownership of radio stations is similar to television stations. Although they are established and owned by the state, many FM radio stations located in urban areas are either granted a concession (to operate the whole station) or their airtime is leased to private companies. Contracting both radio and television stations to private concessionaires not only reduces the burden of production and the stations' expenses but has brought a massive amount of revenue to the state agencies as well.

## 2) Regulation Structure

The enforcement of Thai communication laws is dependent upon the political climate. The authorities might enforce or not enforce the laws depending on the political situation. They would allow some room for critics but if the press crossed over a line, i.e. are seen as too aggressive, the government would warn or sue them. Although the Press Act of 1941 gives broad powers to the authorities to ban publication, censor content and revoke license, shutting down publications is rarely done (Muntrabhorn, 1998).

<sup>1</sup> The data does not include direct satellite broadcasting, which is operated by private companies under state permission (such as ASTV, PTV), and other local pay TV (cable and satellite televisions).

On the contrary, broadcasting media were regulated under three major policies. First, the press was censored and widely suppressed (despite the fact that the majority of them were critical of the military status quo and supportive of a parliamentary democracy). Second, the military government created a country-wide radio network (during 1948-1955) in an effort to launch its "ideological state apparatus" to counter press criticism and political opposition. Third, the Anti-Communism policy after WWII was the core effort to eliminate those who spoke against the military government (Siriyuvasak, 1996, p. 183).

During the Cold War period, the military government enacted several laws to regulate broadcasting. Two major laws were the Broadcasting Act of 1955 and the Radio Communications Act of 1955, which gave the state full control over the allocation of radio frequencies and channels, licensing, and program content. Radio frequency and channels are allocated by the Post and Telegraph Department (PTD), while Public Relation Department (PRD) has the authority to grant licenses to private broadcasters, which it may revoke subject to appeal. However, the laws do not apply to the Ministry of Defense. In addition, almost every radio and television station has to transmit state news from the PRD at certain times of the day (Muntarbhorn, 1998). Until 1974 the government established a board to pre-censor and control all aspects of broadcasting. The board was later replaced by the National Broadcasting Administrative Commission (NBAC) in 1992. Still, state ownership and regulatory structures did not change. NBAC's authorities were similar to the previous board, considering and giving permission to establish or remove broadcasting stations and enacting rules concerning the supervision of programs, advertisements and commercials (Muntarbhorn, 1998).

To date, although revoking licenses of stations have seldom occurred, many stations exercise self-censorship, either reducing the aggressive tone of coverage or changing the commentators. Control comes not only from state mechanisms but also from business and advertisement deals provided corporations identified with politicians and/or political parties. Interference could come through media owners or owners of broadcasting frequencies, through patronage relations or advertising deals, or even through state mechanisms as explained above. For instance, the government, after leasing some radio or television stations to private companies, simply sent signals to operators, such as by phone or sending a letter, that certain stories or programs contained negative, radical opinions or sensitive issues (Aphornsuvan, 1997).

Therefore, some media operators have adjusted programs for commercial considerations or allocated more airtime to the views of business, patronage and the government. Some news-analysis programs have also been removed from the stations' program schedule because they would not compromise with the authorities. Control of the broadcasting media clearly was not following the principles of free speech, diversity of opinion and public interest. Various reactions result: self-censorship, allotment of more space or airtime to the government or politically influential business groups without consideration for other parties, and expansion of sensational news emphasizing entertainment and highly personal matters (such as rape cases, an elite new album, love affairs of celebrities) (Thai Journalist Association, 2004, p. 21).

### **III. Media reform and Independent Regulatory Agency**

As discussed, the Thai communication system and resources have been fully controlled by the government for more than five decades. The logic behind the regulation is that the broadcast spectrum is a limited public resource; therefore, its use must be controlled by the state to ensure the most effective use and hence the greatest public benefits (McCargo, 1997). Although the state in Thailand has claimed to adopt a 'public service approach,' in reality, the state-owned radio and television stations are more directly responsible to the state than to the public. During the Cold War era, broadcasting networks were key instruments used by the state in the fight against colonialism and communism. But after the end of the Cold War, Thai broadcasting media became a state public relations tool and a business benefit for the entertainment industry. The media environment has been

characterized by patronage authoritarianism and privileged capitalism (Siriuyasak, 1999), which have been important obstacles to progressive changes. Near the end of the 1990s, this media structure and regulation were broadly questioned, and the Thai public started to call for reform of the country's communication policy.

### **1) *Initiation of Media Reform***

The quest to restructure broadcast ownership can be traced to the first wave of the student movement in 1973, but the government at that time reacted by establishing the National Broadcasting Executive Board (later replaced by the National Broadcasting Administrative Commission after the May crisis in 1992). The board and the later commissioners had exercised extensive censorship and regulatory powers. For instance, the Commission considers and grants permission to establish or remove broadcasting stations and enacting rules concerning the supervision of programming, advertisements and commercials (Muntarbhorn, 1998).

Near the end of the 1980s, the economy was the main force challenging the state authorities due to the demand for better telecommunication infrastructures. The global trend of communication liberalization also caused the government to lose its grip on communication systems and regulations. Particularly, Thailand joined the WTO's Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications in 1996 (Niyomsilpa, 2000). However, the liberalization occurred only in telecommunications, resulting in privatization and expansion of communication infrastructure, including telephones, satellite dishes, and optical fibers for data transfer.

The quest to restructure Thai broadcasting media was strengthened again after the 1992 May crisis, almost twenty years after the first student movement in 1973. Ubonrat Siriuyasak, a Thai media policy professor, noted that the socio-political context in 1973 did not assist in restructuring the broadcasting media in comparison to the similar uprising in May 1992. This is partly because the drive for media reform was tied with political reform after the 1992 crisis. From time to time, broadcast media played mouthpiece for the government in repressing the civil movement. The Thai public began questioning how and why many political events were distorted in radio and television news broadcasts: during the political crisis in May 1992, Bangkok residents had to access international media via Direct Broadcast Satellite in order to find accurate information (Atkins, 1995, p. 1).

After the May 1992 crisis, the government instituted a new television station in response to the public outcry for free and independent broadcasting media. However, one station did not represent democratization of broadcasting in the opinion of media movement groups. Hence, they took the opportunity to launch a campaign to democratize the whole broadcasting system. Extensive lobbying and campaigning resulted in a major step towards a more open and democratic mass communication: the inclusion of a section in the new Constitution of 1997 that provided for a thorough reform of the broadcasting system. It also allowed for the establishment of a new independent regulator to allocate broadcasting licenses to a variety of bidders under the guidelines of the new law ("Media at the Crossroads," 2001). Several communication bills were promulgated after the new Constitution in 1997, such as the Organization for Frequency Allocation Act of 2000 (OFA Act), which required the establishment of new regulatory agencies—a telecommunication commission and a broadcasting commission, separately—to handle the telecommunication and broadcasting industries. It was the beginning of a transformation of the communication structure, both the ownership structure and regulatory structure, from the government's hand to the new regulatory bodies.

The country's media reform was characterized by the democratization of the country's politics, particularly the increasing public awareness of their right for communication after May 1992. Democracy, which the Thai public sought, was left not just in the hands of representatives; rather, civil society groups became aware of the importance of their participation in policy making. Changes in the regulatory framework and institutions, as stated above, could assist in enhancing Thai political and media democratization. Also, it was the first time that regulation of the communication system would move to an independent regulator after it was under state control for more than five decades.

## 2) Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA)

The idea of an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA) is not new in the administrative systems of Western countries, especially in the U.S. An IRA is established with the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of state services and at the same time of advancing the public interest. Nevertheless, an IRA is a very new structure in Thai public administration. Before the enactment of the 1997 Constitution, all of the public service, operation and regulatory duties had been in the hands of the ministry, either government departments or state-owned enterprises under the supervision of the ministries. For example, general elections have been the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; corruption investigations have been the task of the Counter-Corruption Committee under the supervision of Office of the Prime Minister. These include broadcasting and telecommunication services and regulations. For telecommunications, the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) and Communication Authority of Thailand (CAT), state-owned enterprises under the supervision of Ministry of Transportation and Communication, provided telephone services, satellite, internet and data transfers until they were privatized in 2005. For broadcasting services, PRD, MCOT, the military and others have provided service and some of them also regulated the industry.

State agencies and enterprises in Thailand faced substantial problems during the past decade. This is similar to many governments in developing countries in the late 1980s, when economic booms and globalization trends put pressure on many countries to privatize or liberalize state services and public utilities. They were accused of the inability to provide public services both in quality and in quantity. Many analyses found the bureaucratic system had also been a hindrance because it was a monopoly and could be readily corrupted. Hence, proposals for reforming public service aim to alleviate corruption and to improve efficiency and social benefits, e.g. accessibility, affordability, and better service quality. Major models for the reform are privatizing and “increas[ing] the independence of [the] regulation of public and private monopolistic operators to increase their transparency... [this]...would increase political accountability of the regulatory role and thereby reduce corruption” (Estache et al., 2006, p. 1).

In Thailand, the establishment of IRAs, especially in the communication arena, is also consistent with its commitments under the WTO basic telecommunications agreement—the fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)—signed in February 1997. The commitments include opening its international telecommunications market by the year 2006, and establishing both a transparent interconnection regime and a separate regulatory body (Grey et al., 2002, p. 12).

**Table 2:** Categories of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Thailand

| <i>Purposes and tasks</i> | <i>Agencies</i>  |
|---------------------------|--|
| Jurisdiction              | - Constitutional Court,<br>- Administrative Court,<br>Criminal Supreme Court for Politicians   |
| Administrative ruling     | - National Election Commission<br>National Counter Corruption Commission   |
| Advisory                  | National Human Rights Commission   |
| Others                    | - National Telecommunication Commission (NTC)<br>- National Broadcasting Commission (NBC)<br>- Council of National Economics and Social Advisory<br>- Anti-Money Laundering Commission<br>- Consumer Protection Agency |

In addition to the agreement with the WTO, the 1997 Constitution required the establishment of eight IRAs and mandated organic laws to establish another six IRAs. As summarized in Table 2, four groups of IRAs were categorized based on their tasks: jurisdiction, administrative ruling, advisory,

and others. First, the objective of establishing IRAs for jurisdiction is to create special courts for judging particular issues. Second, the IRAs for administrative ruling are intended to scrutinize and make decisions regarding particular administrative tasks, which should be independent from the council of the ministries. Third, the advisory IRAs are expected to support other executive tasks. The last category is the IRAs established according to other laws. Their tasks are dependent upon particular laws. NTC and NBC are categorized in this group with their purpose of ruling and regulating telecommunications and the broadcasting system (Hengchareon, 2005).

It should be noted that the Thai government previously decentralized state services related to territory and materials through the formation of state agencies, enterprises, and elected councils. But all are still under the supervision of the ministries. The government has never allowed ruling and regulation power to be decentralized to other agencies outside the ministries. Many state agencies perceived the establishment of IRAs as losing their control and power. However, the reason behind establishing IRAs is to decentralize the regulatory tasks of the state in parallel to public service tasks, so as to elevate the effectiveness of problem-solving and to increase the transparency and accountability of governance. The establishment of the NTC and NBC was opposed by authorities as they saw that they were going to lose power over the communication system that had long been in state hands. More importantly, these two industries involve billions of dollars of state revenues; therefore, the shift to the new regulatory bodies was resisted (Vitsanu Varanyu, 2007).


### **3) Uniqueness of the New Independent Regulator**

Whereas most of the members of the IRAs were either nominated (by the judges for the jurisdiction IRAs) or appointed by the Senate and the Prime Minister, NTC and NBC are the only independent regulators for which the designation is complicated, involving a variety of stakeholders. Differing from the FCC in the U.S. and Ofcom in the U.K., the Thai NBC was designed to welcome participation from various interest groups. While FCC commissioners are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, the Thai NBC candidates are nominated by the NBC selection panel and approved by the Senate. Further, the FCC chairman is the key person directing FCC policy and regulation in the U.S. communication industry with the majority vote of the five commissioners. On the contrary, the NBC chairman is selected by an agreement among the seven Commissioners. He or she acts as a secretary general of the commission and the chief-of-staff at the NBC office. Policy and regulations come from discussion and consensus among the Commissioners, not the chairman alone (Sethaporn Cusripitak, 2007).

According to the OFA Act of 2000, the process of establishing the independent regulatory agencies consists of several steps and requirements (see Figure 1). It was designed to encourage participation from related stakeholders. To create a panel for selecting NBC commissioners, the Office of Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's office is responsible for documenting, registering, and processing applications, as well as organizing the panel meetings. Because this was the first time ever to select the Commissioners, the process had to be, again, in the hands of the state. Figure 1 indicates the relevant stakeholders allowed to participate in the NBC selection panel. The panel consists of representatives from the state, communication scholars, professionals, and non-governmental organizations. Their mission is to nominate 14 NBC candidates to the Senate. The seven NBC commissioners, then, are approved by the Senate. The process is the same for selecting NTC commissioners.

On the one hand, this is a new political opportunity for civil participation in the policy process. On the other hand, the focus on the nomination of commissioners limits or ignores other debates such as accessibility of local and community groups in broadcasting networks, enhancing fair market competition, public service broadcasting, and so forth. The next section details the involvement of the stakeholders in the process of establishing the NBC so as to demonstrate how the formation of this IRA was implemented and to determine the key debates among different stakeholders.

**Figure 1: Selection process of the NTC and NBC**



#### IV. Stakeholder analysis

Stakeholders are any individuals or groups who affect or are affected by the policy, strategy, outcome, or organizations' performance. Main attributes of stakeholders are power and legitimacy (Mitchell et al., 1997). Stakeholder analysis is one of many methods employed in policy study. Because public policy is most often a compromise or the result of negotiation among conflicting interests, stakeholder analysis is an analysis of the power structure of stakeholders involved in a policy decision-making process (Majchrzak, 1984). Mitchell et al. (1997) noted that stakeholders could be either powerful or powerless and could have either more or less interest in a policy. This analysis is widely used in organizational research and evaluation. It is also useful in analysis of public policy, as the success of public policy and public organizations depends on the satisfaction of key stakeholders according to their concerns of what is valuable (Bryson, 2003)

In broadcasting reform issue, each stakeholder had his or her own interests and agendas and accepted that not all of those would be accomplished. They differed in desires or intentions in terms of policy goals and motives behind broadcasting reform, such as economic motives or market forces, competition, diversity, freedom of expression, public accessibility and participation. In addition, broadcast policy development has various aspects, such as ownership, licensing, operating and service, technology and standards, pricing and fees, funding, content, and advertising. Each issue is emphasized and interpreted differently among different stakeholders.

After the enactment of the Organization for Frequency Allocation (OFA) Act in 2000, relevant interest groups realized the impact of this law and the enormous opportunities for changes in the communication structure. Extensive involvement of the stakeholders came during the process of selecting the NBC and drafting the Broadcasting Business bill. The struggle then started at the selection panel (see Figure 1) because the stakeholders realized that the more of their own people

they could nominate to the NBC, the greater the chances they would have to control broadcasting policy later. As Rowley & Moldoveanu (2003) observed, the stakeholders mobilized to ensure that their interests (either economic or political) would be included and protected.

To understand the reform of Thai broadcasting, stakeholder analysis could be a meaningful method to discover who is involved in the policy reform process, what their interests are, and what their strategies are in influencing the reform. Specifically, it would address which interest groups were involved in the reform of the Thai broadcasting structure.

### **1) Classification of the Stakeholders**

Majchrzak (1984) suggested an analysis of stakeholders starting with identifying key stakeholders. Table 3 provides a list of all stakeholders in Thai broadcasting reform, according to the OFA Act of 2000 and their involvement from 1997 to 2006. The list of stakeholders is based on the category of internal entities or actors influencing broadcasting policy. It should be noted that external entities such as international organizations (WTO, IMF, and ITU), transnational media corporations and international NGOs are excluded.

As shown in Table 3, the list of stakeholders is categorized into three groups: 1) political groups, composed of the legislature, executive branch, bureaucrats, and the military; 2) business or industry groups, consisting of the broadcasting concessionaires, and broadcasting production companies; and 3) public or civic groups, including communication, public policy and legal scholars who were involved in the reform, media employees and professionals, media activists and other non-governmental organizations interested in democratic values and consumer protection.

**Table 3:** List of the Thai broadcasting stakeholders

| <b>Category</b>            | <b>Organization</b>  | <b>Involvement</b>  |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| <b>Politics</b>            |  |   |
| Parliament                 | - House, Senate  | - policy decision makers, legislature                             |
| Executives/Cabinet         | - PM, Ministry (Office of PM)  | - decision makers, regulator                                      |
| Bureaucrats                | - PRD, PTD, MCOT   | - regulator, broadcast operators                                  |
| Military                   | - Army   | - broadcast operators   |
| Court                      | - Courts   | - policy decision makers, regulator                               |
| <b>Business</b>            |  |   |
| Concessionaire             | - BBTV(operates TV channel 7)<br>- BEC(operates TV channel 3)<br>- UBC (operates cable TV), etc. | - broadcast operators, licensees, concessionaires                 |
| Content providers          | - Entertainment media Companies<br>- News agency companies                                       | - content providers, probably future operators or concessionaires |
| <b>Public/civic groups</b> |  |   |
|                            | - Academic/scholars  | - researchers and policy proposers                                |
|                            | - Labor union & professional associations  | - media employees, policy proposers (concerning press freedom)    |
|                            | - Media reform movements   | - policy proposers (citizen media)                                |
|                            | - NGOs in democratic advocacy and consumer protection  | - policy proposers (democracy, public concern)                    |

### **2) Power and Interests**


The power of the stakeholders is elucidated by decision making, resources at hand, their ability to mobilize resources, and their accessibility to policy decision makers (Majchrzak, 1984). Power is defined by Max Weber (1947) as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship

would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (as cited in Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 865). In other words, it is the ability of the stakeholders to possess enough resources to make the outcomes they desire happen. The stakeholders exercise power based on physical, financial, and symbolic resources. Physical resources such as physical sanctions, forces and violence are ascribed as coercive power. Financial resources including material means, money, goods or services constitute utilitarian power. Symbolic resources are normative symbols such as prestige, esteem and social symbols of acceptance. Therefore, they are the main resources of social power (Etzioni, 1964, as cited in Mitchell et al., 1997)

In addition to power, each stakeholder differs in interest in, desires, and attention to a particular policy. Rowley & Moldoveanu (2003) explained that stakeholders’ degree of discontent or feeling of urgency is the primary condition driving them to influence the organizations. Stakeholders will mobilize to protect or enhance their interests. Interest is viewed as their assumed “preferences based on [typically] economic utility maximization guiding their behavior” (p. 206). Interest can take many forms such as legal or moral rights, legal title, or ownership. Having a stake or interest, the stakeholders are affected (either benefited or harmed) by the organizations’ policy and actions because they bear some risk in relation to the organization. Oftentimes rational or economic interests might guide stakeholders to make cost-benefit decisions to protect their interests. Still, many collective actions of social movements are not based on economic benefits alone. In some cases, interests might be based on shared belief or dogma, affiliation, or common identity. These shared perceptions and feelings of solidarity among members of the stakeholders could also guide them to protect their interests (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003, pp. 206-8).

Bryson (2003) suggested four groups of stakeholders based on their interest and power: (1) *subjects*, who have low power but high interest in the policy, (2) *players*, who have both high power and high interest in the policy, (3) *crowd*, who have both low power and low interest in the policy, and (4) *context setters*, who have high power but low interest in policy. Applying Bryson’s concept of stakeholder analysis, the researcher analyzed the list of the stakeholders (in Table 3) according to their responsibilities and involvement. As indicated in Figure 2, the stakeholders of Thai broadcasting reform are arranged in terms of their power and interests. Four of them were as followed:

**Figure 2: Power and interests of the stakeholders in Thai broadcasting reform**



(1) **Subjects** are public or civic groups, small program production companies, media employees, journalism professionals, media reform movement, and NGOs. These groups have a high interest in the reform of broadcasting because it would impact their jobs and their concerns regarding freedom of expression, public sphere, and public accessibility. Civic groups comprised of communication and public policy scholars are interested in reshaping the broadcast structure and institutions. Journalism associations and media advocacy groups, such as press councils, reporter associations, labor unions, broadcasting professionals associations, and other non-governmental organizations, are interested in releasing the broadcasting media from state hands.

Another civic group is composed of non-governmental organizations concerned with democratic values and consumer protection. Their interest is not economic incentives; rather, it is driven by the shared belief in media democratization and public participation via mass media. Reform is defined as democratization or liberalization of the broadcasting media so as to enhance the accessibility and diversity of public airwaves. In addition to academic and media activist groups, independent producers and media employees are placed in this group, due to the impact of broadcasting reform on their jobs. Although the subjects are interested in reform, their power is less than the players and the context setters. It is difficult to access and drive resources to influence communication policy.

(2) **Players** are those with high power and high interest in the policy. In Thai broadcasting reform, these status quo actors still have high power and a high interest in the broadcasting arena, even after the enactment of the OFA Act of 2000 opened ways for the participation of other stakeholders. Majchrzak (1984) elaborated that the players' power comes from their influence in decision making and their connections to and relationships with the status quo. Some of them are even those in power; thus, their resources are readily available, they have no doubt in their ability to mobilize resources, and they have accessibility to decision makers. Their interests are more often driven by economic incentives. Bureaucratic groups, both civil servants and the military, have resources at hand since the broadcasting media are still under their control. Some of them have authority to change their own broadcast media, such as the Army, PRD, and MCOT (which is now privatized and a public company trading its stock in the market). Some entities still have authority in broadcast regulation and licensing due to the lack of a new regulatory body, such as the current National Broadcasting Administrative Commission of the PRD. Others have responsibilities in the NBC selection process, such as Office of Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office acting as the secretarial office in selecting the new National Broadcasting Commission.

Broadcasting concessionaires are also considered to be in this group due to their close connection with the state through the granting of concessions, i.e. high potential accessibility to decision makers. Moreover, some large media conglomerates, either by leasing air time or operating stations, also have interest and power, because they could be the future broadcast operators after the establishment of the new regulator. For instance, the Grammy group, a large recorded music and entertainment content provider, planned to apply for a license for a new free television station ("Interview Paibul," 2003). Some of them have close connections or relationships with private concessionaires, politicians and ministers. For example, in 2003 an executive of BEC, a concessionaire of TV Channel 3, was rewarded a ministry position in Thaksin Shinawatra's cabinet, and the BBTV extended its contract for television channel 7 with RTA without any rivals.

(3) **Crowd** is the audience or ordinary citizens affected by the broadcasting reform. This group has both less power and less interest in the policy. Broadcasting policy is typically regarded as being far from day-to-day life, compared to other public policies such as social welfare, taxes, finance, and trade. Therefore, it is not surprising that ordinary Thai citizens and audiences have little concern about changes in broadcasting media. A professor in communication studies told the researcher that the general Thai public "don't give a damn" about what is going to change, as long as they are able to watch their favorite Thai drama and listen to popular songs or their favorite radio programs (personal

communication, May 17, 2007). This idea was confirmed by other interviewees. Some also went into detail that though many Thai people are concerned about the quality of television and radio programs, they would do nothing except grumble (personal communication, June 5, 2007).

(4) **Context setters** are the high power groups involved in the policy-decision making but have less interest. The parliament and the court are categorized in this group because they have power through policy making decisions. They also have plenty of other concerns that they perceive to be more important than broadcasting issues. Therefore, broadcasting is not prioritized as of the highest importance compared to economic problems, fiscal budgets, trade, and other critical social problems. For example, the Senate has responsibility in selecting seven out of the fourteen candidates to be the NBC Commissioners, according to the Act of 2000. After pressure from media advocacy groups concerning the ambiguity of the NBC selection process, the Senate set up a committee to scrutinize the problem of the selection process and filtered the qualifications of the 14 nominees in 2002. In this case then, the Senate could be considered a decision maker.

In addition to the Senate, the court also played an important role in decision making. Amidst the investigation of the Senate's committee, two NBC candidates separately sued the NBC selection panel and Office of Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's office. The first suit was concluded with the Supreme Administrative Court's order in February 13, 2003, that the selection process was unlawful due to conflict of interest between some selectors and the nominees ("NBC stagnant," 2003). After the second round of selection, another candidate also filed a law suit against Office of Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, and the Court order was quite similar to the first verdict (Bangprapa & Santimatanedol, 2005) with the result that the NBC could not be successfully established until up to date.

### **3) Importance and Influence**

Despite the determination of the stakeholders' power and interests, one should not neglect their importance and influence (Morse & Struyk, 2006) because the possession of resource power makes a stakeholder important to the organization (Mitchell et al., 1997). The importance of stakeholders is indicated by their responsibility for and influence on the particular policy. The importance of stakeholders is determined by a claim and their ability to influence. That is, they have a legal, moral or presumed claim on the organization and have ability to influence the direction, process or outcome of its policy (Mitchell et al., 1997). In Thai broadcasting reform the most important stakeholders are those who make final policy decisions. They are the Senate, the Prime Minister and the Court. They all have a legal and presumed claim and ability to influence policy decision making. The Senate has to make final decisions in selecting the commissioners and the Prime Minister has to submit the seven nominees for appointment by the King. However, the Court also has authority to judge a case if it comes into consideration.

Although the Senate and Prime Minister have a great deal of influence on the establishment of the NBC, their power is not absolute. During the process of NBC selection, other stakeholders could have an impact on policy decisions such as bureaucrats, business concessionaires, and media advocacy groups. Their influence on broadcasting reform supports rather than opposes the restructuring of broadcasting system. However, their desires regarding the restructuring details are somewhat different. Whereas media business groups and some state-owned enterprises support privatization and a business scheme, civic groups and media activists—such as journalism professionals, academia, non-governmental organizations—are likely to support democratization, free speech for broadcast media, alternative media and wide public participation.

Joompol Rodcumdee (2007), a former dean of a leading communication school in Thailand and a member of the NBC selection panel, clarified that there were two main groups of stakeholders trying to influence the establishment of the NBC. The status quo, namely state broadcast operators, private licensees, and the military, do not want to lose their power of controlling the broadcasting media. They have applied every effort to keep their media in hand or at least to partly control the

NBC. The second group is the media activists and journalism associations eager to democratize the broadcast media because they believe that liberalization from state hands could lead to better public accessibility and better freedom of expression, which, in turn, would enhance the public sphere and the country's democracy. Communication academics support the media activist groups due to their ideology of media democratization and proposed media roles in democratic society (personal communication, June 8, 2007). Still, the first group has more power and interests than the second group to influence policy reform in their direction.

One example supporting the military stance was news coverage of a military plan after the establishment of NBC. According to the report, the military claimed that it was essential to continue ownership of broadcast stations for national security, emergency reporting, and public relations. The Army might consider returning around fifty stations (of more than 200) for reallocation, while other units (such as Headquarters, Navy and Air Force) claimed that most of their frequencies were utilized for national security because they were located near a national boarder (Panpit, 2001). Major General Surasak Kanjanarat (2007), Director of Civil Affairs, Royal Thai Army, explained that the revenue from broadcasting operations does not need to return to the government according to the ministerial rules, and the Army needs it. The use of that budget is for military tasks, the countries' emergency preparedness, and military welfare. He explained that:

*"We need radio stations for national security, military public relations, and emergencies. If we returned the frequencies today to reallocate, later we would have to ask for a higher state budget for publicity; and the achievement of military operations demanding extensive public cooperation would be more difficult. With the revenue we are more flexible in our operations, particularly, when any crisis or emergency occurs. However, I do agree that some stations, at the beginning, were established to support political and economic purposes of some Army Generals. Some units enjoyed gaining revenues from licensing and leasing airtime rather than operating for national security or publicity purposes; this should be altered"* (personal communication, July 27, 2007).

#### **4) Strategies of the Stakeholders**

The strategies of the stakeholders to influence policy decision making are different. The *subjects* such as civic groups and media activist groups put pressure on policy decision makers through conferences, meetings, publicity, and submission of formal petitions. Media activist groups put pressure both directly and indirectly on decision makers, such as by publicizing the unaccountability of the NBC selection, lobbying some senators to investigate the selection process, submitting petitions to the PM and other authorities, and appealing cases for the court's consideration.

In contrast, the *players* who have high power also have high influence. During the selection of the new regulatory agency, the 2000 OFA Act stipulated the representation from a variety of relevant interest groups. But before selecting the commissioners, all of them began to fight for their space in the panel. Among 17 members of the NBC selection panel, the state—bureaucrats and military—already has five seats (see Figure 1). The four representatives from media professionals were those nominated by private concessionaires and media business groups. Choosing the four media professionals for the NBC selection panel was chaos. The Thai Journalist Association (TJA) accused the broadcasting business associations of setting up hundreds of associations to dominate the nomination, whereas the broadcasting business associations claimed that TJA had nothing to do with broadcasting because they were print media professionals (Jamnan, personal communication, June 26, 2007). Finally, the four representatives came from television and radio broadcasters who have close links with the military (former Army executive board of TV Channel 5) and private concessionaires (Channel 3 and military radio stations).

This later group led to the concerns about conflicts of interest because some NBC nominees and selectors were former executives or advisors of the same broadcasting stations or the same companies. For example, two of the seven NBC nominees were a retired Army General and a

broadcasting advisor (both are on the executive board of TV Channel 5), while one member of the selection committee, nominated under the media professionals' quota, is the director of TV Channel 5. Another member of the selection committee, under the media professional quota, is an employee of BEC, a business concessionaire operating TV Channel 3, whereas two of seven NBC nominees are board members of BEC. According to the Administrative Court's verdict in February 2003, the committee did not exclude those officials who had a conflict of interest from voting on candidates with whom they had business relationships. Two selection committee members had relationships with four of seven candidates in a way that caused unfairness in the selection (Taengkheaw, 2003).

Additionally, other state agencies, the *players*, ignored the new regulator. Some of them avoided being under the control of the NBC. For example, the Public Relations Department claimed that it should be exempt from the control of the new NBC, according to a law creating the PRD (Direct General of PRD, personal communication, July 23, 2007). MCOT, a state-owned enterprise, finished its privatization without the new regulator, despite its control over two free TV stations, one subscribed TV station and more than 60 radio stations around the country. MCOT claimed that it had to be privatized due to the government plan of privatizing state-owned enterprises, and as such, NBC had nothing to do with its business ("MCOT ignores NBC," 2004).

The selection process for members of the NBC selection committee failed. On February 13, 2003, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Lower Administrative Court's ruling to withdraw the process because there were business interests among some selected committee members. Some of the committee members then resigned (two NGO representatives and two communication scholars), but the others insisted on staying put and continuing with the second round selection. NGOs, the academia and journalism professionals demanded the resignation of the whole selection committee so that the entire process could be restarted, this time with more accountability ("NGOs slam NBC panel," 2003). There has been no response from the remaining selection committee members or Office of Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's office who acts as the coordinator in the process (Thai Journalist Association, 2004). Rather, the secretarial Office continued the second round selection by asking other NGOs and mass communication academia groups to choose delegates to replace those who had resigned. The second round selection went to a list of seven nominees with the PM's approval. Noticeably, the seven nominees in the second round were almost the same as the 14 nominees of the first round. Those who were accused of conflict of interest in the first round were still nominated in the second round by the committee members. Again, the Office of Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's office was sued by an NBC candidate. The Administrative Court's verdict upheld the candidate, resulting in nullifying the NBC establishment again (Bangprapa, 2006). Consequently, the *context setters* (the court and the parliament) are the most influential stakeholders in the phenomenon.

One contention among stakeholders was whether to let the NBC nominees function with close oversight or whether they should not function because the selection process was not transparent. The nominees serving in the first Commission should be independent and accountable with no conflict of interest whatsoever, as it will set the groundwork of the broadcasting system for the next decade. The first viewpoint was supported by many media business and broadcasting operators because their business was affected by not having the NBC. An executive producer of TV drama groused about how he could set his five-year strategic and investment plans if the NBC establishment was still uncertain ("Will I have my career next year?," 2001). Conversations between the researcher and two executives of media production companies repeated the same concerns. In contrast, the second viewpoint was advocated by journalists and some NGO groups because they projected that if the unaccountable commissioners were allowed to function, the future of the broadcast system would be dark and reform of broadcasting media would not be achieved because those candidates are the nominees of the status quo (Thepchai Yong, personal communication, June 12, 2007).

Prolongation of the establishment of the National Broadcasting Commission indicated a power struggle among the stakeholders. On the one hand, it seemed to hamper Thai communication

reform, because the longer it took to establish the Commission, the greater the damage to the communication industry. Without a new independent regulator, everything has remained stagnant. No new licenses have been issued for more than five years. The first NBC commissioners were expected to be transparent and accountable because they were going to set the groundwork for a whole new broadcasting system valued at billions of dollars. Most communication reformer such as NGOs, journalists and some communication scholars insist that the delay of the establishment of the regulatory group is more acceptable than appointing unaccountable commissioners with conflicts of interest.

## **V. Conclusion and Recommendation**

We cannot say that a policy choice is right or wrong at a specific time and place without taking into account its full context. In particular, one cannot say that there is one institutional form which is simply best for everybody. The provision and regulation of public goods, such as broadcasting and telecommunication, when controlled by the state, could be the best fit at a certain time. When the economics and technology are developed, competition and participation in the communication system and industry may be enhanced. White (1995) argues that a communication system should be reorganized to permit all sectors of a population to contribute to the pool of information that provides the basis for local or national decision-making and the basis for allocation of resources in society. All sectors should have the opportunity to contribute to the formation of the national culture that defines their social values. All people should have access to media (both to produce and convey their message and to receive a message). The public should have the opportunity to criticize, analyze, and participate in the communication process.

Following White's (1995) ideas, Thai media restructuring is effected by changing the laws, policies and media systems or structures to better serve the public (i.e. promote democratic values). Free and independent media are one of the goals of media restructuring. The openness of legislation also provided an opportunity to create competition and participation. But because it is the only battlefield, every stakeholder tried to draw all their power and resources to fulfill their interests. Policy development is usually seen as a bargain among the powerful elites. However, the stakeholder analysis shown that Thai civil sector has increased its participation in the regulation process. The regulatory debate of Thai media reform, thus, is moving toward democratizing communication.

There were some lessons learned should be useful to both policymakers and media reform advocates. The researcher found that the reform process was hampered by a lack of cooperation among various stakeholders. Bargaining among stakeholders obviously leads to political constraints throughout the time a specific policy is being developed. The culture of politics in Thai democracy still conceals elitism in political and social structures. Both political and legal problems may severely constrain the implementation of a policy that attempts to remove strong central control over a large and complex political system.

The frameworks policymakers have to work with influence the implementation of a certain policy, as do biases or subjective perspectives. The perspectives on media reform also follow this pattern. In Thai media policy, market competition perspectives have gained wide attention. However, perspectives encouraging accessibility and participation from every part of society have received minimal attention from the state. Thus, policymakers should try to balance these perspectives in an implementation stage.

In addition, overlapping and conflicting provisions of law, different perceptions of legal standards of bureaucrats and politicians, as well as other contextual factors are all variables obstructing policy implementation and the formation of NBC. The policymakers should have more discussions about the problems of implementation during the initial stages of policy formation. The establishment of NBC is a good example for future policy decision-makers.

Also, the arguments of both state and non-state actors rest on different assumptions that have not yet been subjected to careful analysis and debate. Both have failed to acknowledge or incorporate into their own understanding the other's viewpoints. A fragmented policy discourse showed no signs of progress toward an improved understanding of policy reform, which in turn resulted in fragmented and ineffective media democratization. The state (bureaucrats, the military and politicians) and non-state (media activists and media businesses) sectors should reconsider the "media reform" metaphor and the ways it has been employed.

Moreover, the convergence of communication technology seems to "undermine the scarcity rationale: [that is] the physical characteristic[s] and limitations of the radio spectrum are no longer a decisive factor in explaining the structure of media markets" (Vick, 2006, p. 31). Legal debates in Thai media reform should go beyond the allocation of radio spectrum. The new IRA should consider the convergence of communication technology in its design of regulatory frameworks.

Finally, discourses on media reform among the stakeholders do not transcend politics as usual and move toward democratization. They have battled over putting their people in the new IRA, while forgetting to ponder procedures or systems of oversight for this new agency. John Dewey (as cited in Heineman et al., 1990) offered the crucial notion that the validity of a social institution is properly judged by the degree to which it contributes to the improvement of society as a whole. Therefore, the characteristics of accountability and good governance shown by institutions do not rely only on who the presidents, chairpersons, or commissioners are, but also how they function to serve the public as a whole. Surveillance and accountability should be another consideration for the media policymakers. This could also be a consideration of media activism. Media reform advocates should pursue the further objectives of developing procedures for overseeing the new regulator. Protests about the nomination of the commissioners might prolong the implementation of a media reform program. Instead, forming a strong oversight system could assist the public scrutinizing the functions of the regulator, enhancing its accountability whoever serves on the commission.

## References

- Act on Organization for Allocating Broadcasting Frequency and Supervising Radio/Television Broadcasting and Telecommunication Businesses, B.E. 2543. (2000). Retrieved February 23, 2007, from <http://www.krisdika.go.th> (In Thai).
- Aphornsuvan, Thanet. (1997). Communication and the preservation of national identity. *Media Development*, vol. 2.
- "Army and PRD ignore NBC" said Senator Chemsak (2004, June 19). *Post Today*, p. A6 (in Thai).
- Army plans to launch a new public company, ignores NBC. (2004, June 11). *Krungthep Thurakit*, pp. 1, 4 (in Thai).
- Atkins, W. (1995). *Satellite television and state power in Southeast Asia: New issues in discourse and control*. Perth: Edith Cowan University.
- Bangprapa, Mongkol. (2006, September 29). Court upholds NBC ruling, Selection panel back to square one. *Bangkok Post*, p. 2.
- Bangprapa, Mongkol & Santimatanedol, Ampa. (2005, November 24). Court bars frequency watchdogs. *Bangkok Post*, p. 1.
- Bryson, J. M. (2004 ). What to do when stakeholders matter. *Public Management Review*, 6(1), 21-53.
- Ekachai, Daradirek. (2000). Thailand. In S. A. Gunaratne (Ed.), *Handbook of the media in Asia* (pp. 429-461). New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Estache, A., Goicoechea, A., & Trujillo, L. (2006). *Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries*. Washington, DC: Sustainable Development Network, the World Bank.
- Grey, V., Kelly, T., & Minges, M. (2002). *Bits and bahts: Thailand internet case study*. Geneva, Switzerland: ITU. Retrieved October 18, 2007, from <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/cs/thailand/index.html>
- Hengchareon, Noppadol. (2005). Independent regulatory agency: Its importance to the reform of politics and bureaucracy. *Constitutional Court Journal*, 7(21), 43-75 (in Thai).
- Heineman, R., Bluhm, W., Peterson, S., & Kearny, E. (1990). *The world of the policy analyst: Rationality, values, and politics*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Interview Paibul Dumrongchaidharm: Media reform in Grammy's eye. (2003, March 17). *Prachachart Thurakit*, pp. 1, 4 (in Thai).
- Jamnan Siriton (President of the Federation of Broadcasting Business Professional Associations), personal communication, June 26, 2007
- Joompol Rodcumdee (Former dean of the College of Communication Arts, Chulalongkorn University), personal communication, June 8, 2007
- Krasnow, E. G., Longley, L., & Terry, H. (Eds.). (1982). *The politics of broadcast regulation* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Majchrzak, A. (1984). *Methods for policy research*. London: Sage Publications.
- McCargo, D. (1997). Thailand's political parties: Real, authentic and actual. In K. Hewison (Ed.), *Political change in Thailand: Democracy and participation* (pp. 114-131). London: Routledge.
- MCOT ignores NBC continues privatization plan. (2004, March 18). *Krungthep Thurakit*, pp. 1, 4 (in Thai).
- Media at the crossroads (2001). *Media and Gender Monitor*. Issue 11.
- Mitchell, R., Agle, B., & Wood, D. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. *The Academy of Management Review*, 22(4), 853-886.
- Morse, K., & Struyk, R. (2006). *Policy analysis for effective development*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Muntarbhorn, Vitit. (1998). *Mass media laws and regulations in Thailand*. Singapore: AMIC.
- NBC stagnant, Court vows conflict of interest. (2003, February 14). *Matichon*, pp. 1, 14 (in Thai).
- NGOs slam NBC panel members. (2003, March 8). *The Nation*, p. 3.
- Niyomsilpa, Sakkarin. (2000). *The political economy of telecommunications reforms in Thailand*. London; New York: Pinter.
- Panpit, Kongdej. (2001, June 11). Military deny returning their radio stations, allege national security. *Krungthep Thurakit*, pp. 3, 20 (in Thai).

- Rowley, T., & Moldoveanu, M. (2003). When will stakeholder groups act? An interest- and identity-based model of stakeholder group mobilization. *Academy of Management Review*, 28(2), 204-219.
- Sethaporn Cusripitak (National Telecommunication Commissioner), personal communication, June 8, 2007
- Siriyuvasak, Ubonrat. (1992). Radio broadcasting in Thailand. *Media Asia*, 19(2), 92-99.
- Siriyuvasak, Ubonrat. (1996). Television and the emergence of 'civil society' in Thailand. In D. French & M. Richards (Eds.), *Contemporary television: Eastern perspectives* (pp. 181-199). New Delhi: Sage.
- Siriyuvasak, Ubonrat. (1999). The Thai media, cultural politics and the nation-state. *International Journal of Communication Law and Policy*, 3 (Summer 1999), 1-19.
- Spyrelli, C. (2003). Regulating the regulators? An assessment of institutional structures and procedural rules of national regulatory authorities. *International Journal of Communication Law and Policy*, 8, 1-65.
- Surasak Kanjanarat, Major General (Director of Civil Affairs Division, Royal Thai Army), personal communication, July 27, 2007
- Taengkheaw, Kasinee. (2003, March 4). NBC candidate choices nullified. *The Nation*, p. 1.
- Thai Journalist Association. (2004). *Gagging the Thai press*. Bangkok, Thailand: Thai Journalists Association in cooperation with the Southeast Asian Press Alliance.
- Thepchai Yong (Former president of Thai Journalists Association), personal communication, June 12, 2007
- Vick, D. W. (2006). Regulatory convergence? *Legal Studies*, 26(1), 26-64.
- Vitsanu Varanyu (Judge, Administrative Court), personal communication, August 15, 2007
- Wangvivatana, Sopit (Ed.). (2005). *Media reform going backward?* Bangkok, Thailand: Thai Broadcast Journalist Association and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Weber, M. (1947). *The theory of social and economic organization*. New York: Free Press.
- "Will I have my career next year?" grouses CEO of Exact Co. (2001, November 13). *Kom Chad Leuk*, p. 5 (in Thai).
- White, R. (1995). Democratization of communication as a social movement process. In P. Lee (Ed.), *The democratization of communication* (pp. 92-113). Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press.